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sections 3 to 5 we have a discussion of Ziller's "concentration" theory. It is expounded in section 3, illustrated in section 5, and criticised by Voigt in section 4. It would add to clearness, we think, were section 5 made to precede section 4. Into the merits of this controversy we cannot enter. Ziller's scheme does not seem to us of the essence of Herbartianism, and it does seem mechanical in the extreme, and neglectful of the art of school experience of the child.

The fourth chapter deals with Government and Discipline. We do not think our authors have succeeded as well here as in the preceding chapter. Their exposition is very brief, and not very thorough. Perhaps this is owing to the fact that the treatment of this subject was the most intelligible portion of the work to which this is primarily an introduction. The book closes with a short account of the relation of Herbart's system to that of Pestalozzi. In conclusion we would cordially recommend its perusal to all teachers who desire something better than blind empiricism as a basis for their work.

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THIER ETHIK. DARSTELLUNG DER SITTlichen U. RECHTLICHEN BEZIEHUNGEN ZWISCHEN MENSCH U. THIER. Preisschrift von Ignatz Bregenzer. Bamberg: C. C. Buchner, 1894. Pp. x., 422.

Nearly all possible relations that can exist between the world of man on the one side and that of the animals on the other, are considered in a most thorough and interesting manner by Bregenzer, in his "Animal Ethics." The book is provided with abundant references to the literature of the subject, and shows that the author's knowledge is comprehensive and covers the whole field under consideration. It has the advantage over similar books of being extremely interesting and instructive, and at the same time absolutely free from sentimental declamation.

The matter falls into two parts: one, ethnologico-historical, the other systematic, of which the latter is by far the more important on account of its distinct statement of the author's own views. But in the first part he often finds occasion to bring out his fundamental stand-point. Yes, Bregenzer designates the ethnological part as what is (comparatively) new and of central moment in his investigation, since it enables him to prove inductively that the popular ideas concerning the relation of man to animals are, after all,

at the root of philosophical theories. Accordingly, the author considers, first of all, the way in which animals have been regarded by religion (both in its lower and higher forms), and in ordinary life and custom, and in law; and, lastly, the history of scientific animal ethics. It is an uncommonly rich lot of material which is here accumulated and analyzed. Animal worship, totemism, animal sacrifice, all forms of sympathy and antipathy to animals, the position of animals in art and in law, are explained. In the beginning, men were under the influence of the fear of animals, whence arose animal worship. From the taming of domestic animals arose love for them, and consequently law for animals. Parallel with this love contempt also showed itself. Only out of an increasing development of humanity can a really just animal ethics shape itself.

The development of scientific animal ethics corresponds with the development of the people's relations to animals; first comes the primitive animistic speculation corresponding to animal worship; monism and the love for animals coincide; contempt for animals corresponds with the dualistic and anthropocentric views of the mediæval church. Modern animal ethics is contemporaneous with modern humanity.

Bregenzer is a strict monist, a Darwinian, and recognizes in animism the starting-point of religious development. From the rich inductive material offered by the first part of his book, he deduces two important laws for ethics. The one is, that the life of feeling and impulse always forms the starting-point and centre of *ethos*. The second, that the older, primitive, feeling is individualistic (fear), to which the social-ethical feeling (love) succeeds, and out of which it is developed.

The second, systematic part gives us the author's views concerning the fundamental questions of ethics, and here, too, one can thoroughly adopt his point of view, not only as to questions of ethics in general, but in particular as to duty towards the animal world. We have not here the views of a confused, sentimental vegetarian, for whom every injury of an animal, even for the best purposes, is "murder," but with a warm-hearted, serious, and thoughtful man, who is full of love for the animal world and yet leaves mankind its rights. Here we come to the concluding vital point of animal ethics—animal law or right (*Recht*). Is there a common right (*Recht*) between men and animals? Is the relation of mankind to the animal world one of kindly feeling merely or one of right? Bregenzer here stands in opposition to most of

the jurists of to-day. He says: binding force over men's actions, and hence practical significance, can be ascribed not to any divine or philosophic right, but only to a right that is human, positive, created and recognized by ourselves, and therefore enforceable. But a general, international establishment of right by means of law or contract is with the animal world an impossibility, and this the author himself recognizes. The whole matter really turns upon the question, What right has the state to limit the liberty of the individual by laws for the protection of animals? Bregenzer says, animals have a right to protection. The ground of this protection is not humanity's interests, but directly the interests of the animals themselves. The answer as to which position is correct,—Bregenzer or our jurisprudence which will not agree to this,—depends very much upon what is understood by "right." If one takes this conception in the sense given it by jurists, one cannot easily allow that a cat, for example, has the right to demand that it shall not be tormented. If one, however, takes the conception in a wider and more comprehensive sense as justice, and also takes the company of those subject to right in a wider sense, as including animals, then we can indeed say: in the kingdom of nature all living things have an equal right to existence, man no more than any other being. Such an assertion has a deep *moral* truth. But "right" signifies here something broader than is ordinarily understood by it. In tracing out the consequences of this view, Bregenzer does not go far in other respects; he only asks that our laws for the protection of animals be made stricter.

Bregenzer's book may be heartily recommended to all who interest themselves in the animal world, to all who have a warm heart for our fellow-occupants of the earth who are not human; every student of ethics will find much stimulus in it.

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RECENT FRENCH PHILOSOPHICAL AND ETHICAL WRITINGS.

THE French philosophical writings which have been received during the year 1895, a complete list of which is given below, can be classified in several groups, only one of which is directly concerned with Ethics.

At the outset we can set aside books on Metaphysics and Philosophy, such as "*La Théorie de l'Ondulation universelle*," by Basile Conta, who takes up the doctrine of the "First Principles" of